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Abstract
Recent research has shown that default risk accounts for only a part of the total yield spread on
risky corporate bonds relative to their risk-less benchmarks. One candidate for the unexplained portion
of the spread is a premium for liquidity. We investigate this possibility by relating the liquidity of
corporate bonds to the basis between the credit default swap (CDS) price of the issuer and the par-
equivalent corporate bond yield spread. The liquidity of a bond is measured using a recently developed
measure called latent liquidity, which is defined as the weighted average turnover of funds holding the
bond, where the weights are their fractional holdings of the bond. We find that bonds with higher
latent liquidity are more expensive relative to their CDS contracts, after controlling for other realized
measures of liquidity. However highly illiquid bonds with high default risk are also expensive, consistent
with limits to arbitrage between CDS and bond markets, due to the higher costs of “shorting” illiquid
bonds. Additionally, we document the positive effects of liquidity in the CDS market on the CDS-bond
basis. We also find that several firm-level variables related to credit risk affect the basis, indicating that
the CDS price does not fully capture the credit risk of the bond.
JEL Classification: G100 (General Financial Markets)
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1 Introduction
Corporate bonds are amongst the least understood instruments in the US financial markets. This
is surprising given the sheer size of the US corporate bond market, about 3.6 trillion dollars out-
standing as of March 2008, which makes such bonds an important source of capital for US firms.
These bonds carry a risk of default, and hence command a yield premium or spread relative to
their risk free counterparts. However, the academic literature in finance has been unable to explain
a significant component of corporate bond yields/prices in relation to their Treasury counterparts,
despite using a range of credit risk pricing models and calibration techniques.
Prior studies have noted that although default risk is an important determinant of the yield
spread, there are other factors such as liquidity, taxes, and aggregate market risk variables (other
than credit risk) that may also play a significant role in determining the spread. Of these other
factors, it has been conjectured that liquidity effects have an important role to play in the pricing of
corporate bonds, and are reflected in the non-default component of their yields, i.e. the portion of
the corporate bond yield that cannot be explained by factors related to default risk.1 Unfortunately,
the non-default component of corporate bond yields/prices has been inadequately studied, largely
due to the paucity of data. In particular, the absence of frequent trades in corporate bonds makes
it difficult to compute trade-based measures of liquidity relying on quoted/traded prices or yields to
measure liquidity, as has been done in the equity markets. It is difficult, therefore, to measure the
liquidity of corporate bonds directly. Consequently, it is a challenge to directly study the impact of
liquidity on corporate bond yields and prices, thus leaving the discussion of corporate bond spreads
somewhat incomplete.
In recent years, the credit default swap (CDS) market has emerged as the barometer of the
market’s collective judgment of the credit risk of the bonds issued by an obligor. The CDS price is
thus a proxy for the premium attached to credit risk, although it may itself be affected by market
frictions, as discussed later on in the paper.2 In this paper, we study the CDS-bond basis, the
difference between the CDS price of the issuer and the par-CDS equivalent spread of the bond, as a
(somewhat imperfect) measure of the non-default component of the bond yield.3 In this paper, we
relate the CDS-bond basis, which is a noisy measure of the non-default component of bond yields,
to bond liquidity and other variables such as the bond characteristics, firm-level credit risk effects
and liquidity in the CDS market itself. There are several significant contributions we make in this
study.
1See, for example, the discussion below on papers by Longstaff et al. (2005), Elton et al. (2001), Eom et al. (2003)
and others.
2The CDS price is often referred to buy market participants as the CDS “spread” since it is seen to be analogous
to a spread over LIBOR.
3The par CDS-equivalent spread is the spread of a hypothetical CDS contract that has the same default probability
and recovery rate as implied by the price of the bond, and more accurately captures the economic value of the basis,
than the simple difference between bond yield spreads and the CDS price, which could be affected by coupon payments
and the level of the risk free rates.
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First, we use and further validate a new measure of bond liquidity, called latent liquidity,
proposed by Mahanti et al. (2007), which is based on the holdings of bonds by investors, and thus
does not require a large number of observed trades for its computation. This measure weights
the turnover of the funds that own the bond by their fractional holdings; thus, it is a measure
of the accessibility of a bond to market participants. The attractive feature of this measure is
that it circumvents the problem of non-availability of transaction data for corporate bonds, and
yet provides a reasonable proxy for liquidity. We show that our measure has explanatory power
for the liquidity component of the CDS-bond basis, even after controlling for trading volume and
other bond characteristics such as age, coupon and issue size, that have been associated with bond
liquidity.
Second, we show that even after controlling for credit risk using the price of the CDS contract,
corporate bond prices are still affected by factors related to the default risk in the firm. Since the
CDS contract is essentially a derivative contract on the reference corporate bonds, the presence of
such effects is indicative of frictions between the corporate bond market and the CDS market. We
find that the effect is one sided - when firms are riskier, their corporate bonds tend to be relatively
expensive. Furthermore, it is the illiquid bonds of riskier firms that are more expensive relative
to their CDS contracts. Our interpretation is that this conclusion is due to the effects of limits
to arbitrage. Agents participating in the CDS market and the corporate bond market may have
different valuations for the credit risk of the obligor. However, arbitrageurs who try to profit from
this difference may find it difficult to sell corporate bonds short, because of limited supply in the
borrowing and lending market for corporate bonds.
Third, we show that the liquidity of the CDS contract influences both the liquidity of the bond
and the bond price itself. We use bid-ask spreads, both in basis points and as a percentage of
the mid-quote, as measures of CDS liquidity. Bonds of issuers whose CDS contracts enjoy greater
liquidity tend to be more expensive (have lower yields) in the cross-section, compared with their
less liquid counterparts, after adjusting for various bond characteristics. This is evidence of some
spillover effects from the CDS market to the corporate bond market.
Fourth, we demonstrate the effect of individual bond characteristics, such as the presence or
absence of covenants and differences in tax status, once bond prices after credit risk in the form of
the CDS price is controlled for. To our knowledge, this is the first study that studies the effect of
bond covenants on bond valuation, using the CDS price as a control for credit risk.
In addition to the points mentioned above, we analyze and confirm several relationships doc-
umented in the literature about the effect of factors like coupon, amount outstanding and age on
the liquidity of bonds, using a much more current and extensive data-set than has been used in
previous studies.
The novel bond-liquidity measure that we use in this paper is related to the theory proposed by
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) according to which, in equilibrium, assets with the lowest transaction
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costs are held by investors with the shortest trading horizon, and have higher prices. Our metric
can thus be thought of as a direct measure of the activity of funds holding a particular bond.
It is also related to the literature on liquidity and asset prices, most notably Vayanos and Wang
(2006), who use a search-based model to provide for an endogenous concentration of liquidity in
particular assets. This concentration leads to active investors participating in these assets, thus
lowering transaction costs and leading to higher prices at the same time. In this sense, our measure
can be thought of as directly measuring the extent of search frictions when the marginal holders of
a particular bond wish to trade.
Our bond price data come from transacted prices and volumes as reported on the Trade Re-
porting And Compliance Engine (TRACE) system assembled by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA)(formerly known as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)).
Introduced in the second quarter of 2002, TRACE has, over time, come to represent the most
comprehensive database of all (TRACE-eligible) corporate bonds that are traded in the U.S. mar-
ket. Our CDS price data are obtained from two different sources, Credit Market Analytics (CMA)
DataVision and GFI Group Inc. We use the CDS bid and ask prices as reported on Bloomberg by
CMA DataVision, after October 1, 2004, when they became available from this source. In order
to extend the series backwards to the extent possible, prior to October 1, 2004, we use data from
GFI Group Inc., the largest institutional broker in the CDS market. We conduct tests to ensure
consistency between the two series, in the period where there was an overlap between them, as
discussed in section 3 below. We compute latent liquidity using a database of corporate bonds
assembled by State Street Corporation (SSC), one of the largest custodians in the global markets.
This paper is divided into the following sections. Section 2 reviews the literature from the point
of view of our measure. Section 3 describes our data sources. Section 4 discusses the latent liquidity
measure proposed by Mahanti et al. (2007) and the manner in which we compute the CDS-bond
basis. Section 5 discusses the results of our study explaining the basis in terms of liquidity metrics
of the bond and CDS markets, as well as firm and bond characteristics. Section 6 concludes.
2 Literature Review
This paper is related to the considerable volume of literature that attempts to describe the effect
of liquidity on asset prices. Most of this literature relates to the concept of liquidity costs and
associated liquidity premia in stocks, although there is a some recent literature that deals with
corporate bonds. While a comprehensive survey of this literature is beyond the scope of this
study, we touch upon a few contributions that underpin the prevailing academic perspective on the
effects of liquidity on asset prices.4 In an early contribution in this area, Amihud and Mendelson
(1986) argue that transaction costs result in liquidity premia in equilibrium, reflecting the differing
4The literature on liquidity effects in the broad context of asset pricing is too vast for us to detail here. See
Amihud et al. (2006) for a comprehensive survey.
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expected returns for investors with different trading horizons who have to defray their transaction
costs. There is an implicit clientele effect due to which securities that are more illiquid, and are
cheaper as a result, are held in equilibrium by investors with longer holding periods. This work has
been extended and modified in different directions over the years.5
A closely related branch of literature has to do with modeling liquidity costs in corporate
bonds. The earliest study of this nature is by Fisher (1959), who uses the amount outstanding of a
bond as a measure of liquidity, and the earnings volatility as a measure of the credit risk of the firm,
and finds that yield spreads on bonds with low issue sizes (illiquid bonds) are higher. Also notable
is a recent paper by Chen et al. (2007), who provide a method for estimating transaction costs in
the corporate bond market and apply it to corporate bonds. Our paper uses more detailed data
on the institutional holdings of bonds to construct an alternative measure of liquidity, called latent
liquidity, which can be used even in the absence of transaction data. The relationship between this
measure and transaction costs as well as market impact has been demonstrated by Mahanti et al.
(2007).
There have also been several attempts to decompose the yield spread on corporate bonds in
terms of the component that is related to the defaultable nature of these securities, as opposed to
other factors. For instance, Eom et al. (2003) and Huang and Huang (2003) use structural models
to explain the spreads on corporate bonds and find that most structural models are only able to
explain about half of the corporate bond spreads for a range of reasonable parameters assumed for
the firm value process. Elton et al. (2001) find evidence of a significant coupon effect in corporate
bonds which they attribute to the differential treatment of coupons on corporate bonds relative to
Treasury securities.
An important related paper in this strand of the literature is by Longstaff et al. (2005), who
fit a common model of credit risk to both corporate bonds and to credit default swaps. Assuming
that the CDS price completely captures the default-related part of the corporate bond yield, they
find evidence of a significant non-default component in the yield spread and are able to relate
it to the coupon as well as variables that are related to the liquidity of a bond, such as the
amount outstanding (in the cross-section), bid/ask spreads, and the liquidity premium for on-
the-run treasury securities in the time series. Blanco et al. (2005) take another approach to the
problem by studying the co-integration relationship between corporate bond spreads and CDS
spreads. They document the presence of a strongly mean-reverting, non-default component in
corporate bond yields. They also find, based on their model of information flows, that the CDS
market leads the corporate bond market, and that most of the corrections introduced by this lead-
lag relationship take place through the non-default component of corporate bond yields. Our paper
adds to this literature by examining the role of liquidity more closely. We also examine whether
frictions in the arbitrage process between bonds and the CDS contracts cause the CDS contract to
5See Huang (2003) and Acharya and Pedersen (2005), for examples.
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capture the underlying credit risk less than completely.
Another strand of the literature that is pertinent to our research here is the work on measures
of liquidity that are appropriate for the corporate bond market. Some papers that study liquidity
effects using transactions based data on bonds include Chakravarty and Sarkar (1999), Hong and
Warga (2000), Schultz (2001) and Hotchkiss et al. (2002). More recently, Houweling et al. (2005)
use liquidity-sorted portfolios in the European market, constructed using nine proxies for liquidity
including issued amount, listing, currency, on-the-run or not, age, whether there are missing prices,
yield volatility, the number of quote contributors, and yield dispersion. However, it is not clear that
these approaches directly control for the credit risk of the bond, as efficiently as the CDS market.
The concept of latent liquidity that is used in this paper draws from Mahanti et al. (2007). La-
tent liquidity is simply the weighted average turnover of the funds holding a particular bond, where
the weights are the fractions of the outstanding amounts of the bond that are held by any given
fund. They introduce this measure of liquidity and relate it to bond-specific characteristics, such
as maturity, age, coupon, rating, the presence or absence of put/call options and other covenants.
They also show that latent liquidity has explanatory power for both transaction costs and market
impact.
3 Data Sources
Our primary source of data for prices and realized liquidity measures for the corporate bond market
is the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) database of FINRA. We first calculate
the volume-weighted average price of a bond on any given day after eliminating cancellations and
trade reversals from our data. In order to limit contamination by off-market trades, we consider
only days when the total traded volume is greater than USD 100,000. We obtain details of bond
characteristics such as coupon, issue date, maturity and issue size from Bloomberg, and match them
with the TRACE data by their Committee on Uniform Securities Identification Procedures (CUSIP)
number. We confirm the reported yield on the bond by performing our own yield computation and
eliminating those observations for which our calculations and the reported yields differ substantially.
Unlike Longstaff et al. (2005), who restrict their sample to bonds around a five-year maturity, we
include bonds of all maturities but include a control for maturity in our computations. From the
TRACE data, we also compute the number of trades in a quarter, the number of traded days in a
quarter and the total dollar amount of any bond traded within a given quarter.
In order to compute our measure of latent liquidity, we use the corporate bond holdings and
transactions database of the State Street Corporation (SSC), one of the largest custodians in the
global financial markets. A custodian provides trade clearance, asset tracking, and valuation service
support to institutional investors. The client of the custodian is the fund, i.e., the owner of the asset,
which may deal with diverse broker-dealers. All these trades are cleared through the custodian,
who thus has access to information about a larger number of trades than an individual broker-
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dealer. In addition, custodians have access to information on who holds the corporate bonds, and
these data permit the construction of the latent liquidity measure that we employ in this research.
Our database contains the end-of-quarter holdings information on all the bonds in our sample,
based on which the latent liquidity measure is computed. The database covers around 15% of all
bonds traded in the US markets and is reasonably representative of the overall US corporate bond
market, as we show below.6 A brief description of the construction of the latent liquidity measure
is presented in section 4.
Our CDS data are derived from two separate sources. Prior to October 2004, we use CDS
prices supplied by GFI Group Inc, the leading broker in the CDS market.7 The database covers
over 1,000 leading corporate names on which credit protection is bought or sold on a fairly regular
basis. It includes daily prices for CDSs for the period from April 1999 to July 2005. Since October
1, 2004, a much wider coverage of CDS names is available from CMA DataVision via the Bloomberg
data service, in a reliable fashion. These data cover over 2,000 issuers on whom CDS contracts are
traded, and subsequent to this date, we, therefore, use these quoted CDS prices (both bid-, ask-
and mid-) for our basis computation. During the period in which the two data sources overlap, we
confirm that they are substantially in agreement. This gives us confidence that our results prior
to October 2004 are comparable to those after October 2004. We also confirm this conclusion by
performing robustness checks by conducting our empirical analysis on the sub-sample after October
2004. (This evidence is presented in table 10.)
There are several advantages to using our combined data-set relative to the those used in prior
research:
• Our dataset covers a longer time period than has been covered by previous studies. Most
notable amongst these studies is the one by Longstaff et al. (2005), which uses a proprietary
database of CDS prices that covers 52 firms over a much shorter time period (from March
2001 to October 2002). The data-set used by Blanco et al. (2005) covers only 33 firms from
Jan 2001 to June 2002. Our combined database covers 1,167 firms and 4,972 bonds over the
period July 2002 to June 2006, with a total of 33,000 bond-quarters.
• There have been significant changes in the market for corporate bonds with the advent of
hedge funds and credit derivatives over the last ten years. Our data-set covers the latter half
of this period, and thus, includes more recent data. This is in contrast to the data used by
many of the previous studies on corporate bond yields, which are, in many cases, based on
the Warga (1997) Fixed Income Securities Database, which contains data prior to 1996, and
has data on about 700 bonds.8
6For a detailed exposition and analysis of the representativeness of the database, please refer to Mahanti et al.
(2007).
7More information about GFI and their CDS database is available at http://www.gfinet.com.
8See, for example, papers by Elton et al. (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Eom et al. (2003) and others.
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• Our data-set contains quotes by a large number of CDS market-makers, and is thus quite
inclusive and reliable.
Data on interest rates, such as swap rates and treasury rates, are obtained from Datastream.
These data are also matched by date with those for corporate bond and CDS trades in our data-set.
In order to focus on the pricing of corporate bonds relative to the CDS contract, we restrict our
attention to data on days on which we observe at least a quote, if not a trade, in both the CDS market
and trades in the corporate bond market. This eliminates, as far as possible, timing mismatches
in the data, and accurately captures the effect of time variation in the default risk inherent in
the bond. For each bond, we also obtain data on the corresponding bond characteristics, such as
coupon, rating, outstanding volume, and bond-specific features such as covenants, tax status and
issuance methods from Bloomberg.9
Additionally, we match the firms in the Compustat quarterly database by ticker and name with
the bonds available in the TRACE database. This allows us to compute firm-level financial ratios
such as leverage and the proportion of tangible assets that we might expect to have a significant
bearing on the credit risk of the firm. In cases where data are not available quarterly, we use data
available as of the previous financial year. In order to account for reporting delays and ensure that
the information is available to the market participants at the time of the trade, we use data from
the quarter prior to the one for which we compute the basis and the liquidity measures.
Table 2 shows the decomposition of the sample by credit rating. The sample is reasonably
representative of the overall composition of the corporate bond market. It also shows the rating
distribution in the holdings database as well as the overall universe. The top four rating categories
account for around 74% of all corporate bonds outstanding, which suggests that the sample is
biased toward investment grade issues. The sample is broadly similar to the samples used in prior
studies of the corporate CDS market, but with many more observations, both cross-sectionally and
over time.10
4 Methodology
4.1 Latent Liquidity
In this section, we describe in brief the methodology used to compute the latent liquidity measure.
In simple terms, latent liquidity is the weighted average turnover of the investors holding a particular
bond, the weights being the fractions of the total outstanding amount of a bond held by various
funds at the beginning of the month.11 The argument behind this computation is that since there
9In the empirical estimations, we follow the numerical scheme used by Compustat to assign numbers to ratings,
where AAA is coded as 1, AA+ is coded as 2 and so on.
10See, for example, Blanco et al. (2005) and Longstaff et al. (2005).
11For a more detailed description of the computation, as well as the relationship between latent liquidity and bond
characteristics, the reader is referred to Mahanti et al. (2007).
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is considerable persistence in turnover, bonds that are held by investors that have a larger turnover
are likely to be more accessible and hence more highly traded. Mahanti et al. (2007) show that this
measure of latent liquidity is correlated with other transaction-based measures of liquidity, such as
trading volume and bid-ask spreads, in the relatively liquid segment of the market where reliable
micro-structure based data are available. However, the advantage of the latent liquidity measure
is that it does not require trade-based information, and is thus available ex-ante for a broader
cross-section of bonds.
Let piij,t denote the fractional holding of a bond i, i = 1, 2, ...I, by fund j, j = 1, 2, ...J , at time
t. Let Tj,t denote the average portfolio turnover of a fund in the months from t to t − 12, where
turnover is defined as the ratio of the dollar trading volume of the fund between time t and t−12 to
the value of the fund at time t. The latent liquidity measure for bond i at time t is simply defined
as:
Lit =
J∑
j=1
piij,tTj,t (1)
We use equation 1 to compute a quarterly value for the latent liquidity of each bond in our
sample, expressed in annual turnover terms. Note that, in this sense, the latent liquidity of the
bond indicates the average trading frequency of the agents holding the bond, and consequently, the
ease with which it may be traded in the presence of search frictions.
4.2 The Basis between CDS prices and Bond Prices
The recent academic literature on corporate bond pricing has attempted to isolate the component
of corporate bond yields that is not attributable to default risk (the non-default component). Most
of the earlier papers in this area use an explicit model for pricing credit risk.12 However, the
advent of the CDS market makes it possible to isolate default risk in corporate bonds issued by
a certain issuer without relying too heavily on a particular model of credit risk and a specific
parameterization, since a direct reading of the market’s pricing of credit risk is available. Most
CDS contracts specify a particular reference asset, but allow for settlement by physical delivery
of other similar obligations of the same issuer.13 Hence, since CDS contracts price default risk
explicitly, they are a good benchmark for the pure credit risk of the firm, and hence apply to all
its traded obligations. Indeed, as argued by Duffie (1999), to a first-order approximation, there is
an equivalence between the CDS price and the spread on the floating rate obligation of a similar
maturity issued by a firm. It must be noted that most corporate bonds issued by firms tend to be
12For example, see papers by Huang and Huang (2003) and Eom et al. (2003).
13There are some recent moves to switch to cash settlement, rather than physical delivery, to avoid the possibility
of a squeeze on the reference bond.
9
fixed-rate bonds, and thus, this equivalence does not hold exactly. More importantly, as shown by
Longstaff et al. (2005), the pure corporate bond spread is a biased measure.
This equivalence is further complicated by differing definitions of the CDS contract, especially
in the early years of our sample period. However, with the increasing use of standard International
Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) agreements between counter-parties, this is less of a
problem in recent years. Even so, the problem of delivery terms remains. In case of a default,
a typical CDS contract requires the delivery of the reference obligation (or a similar obligation)
in exchange for face value. However, if the deliverable bonds are illiquid, the buyer of the CDS
protection who needs to deliver them may incur an additional liquidity cost to source the bonds in
the market. This is particularly true when there are frictions in the arbitrage mechanism between
the CDS contract and the bond, primarily due to the costs of “shorting” the bond. In addition, the
bond that is deliverable into the CDS contract would be the cheapest among the candidate bonds;
hence, the other bonds would trade at a price premium or yield discount to the cheapest-to-deliver
bond.14
Subject to the above caveats, there are different approaches to isolating the non-default part
of the corporate bond spread, which could then be related, at least in part, to liquidity effects. One
possible approach is to use the difference between the CDS price and the simple corporate bond
yield as a model-independent (albeit noisy) proxy for the non-default component of the corporate
bond yield spread. However, this approach may lead to errors for two reasons. The first is due
to the definition of the CDS contract, which offers protection equivalent to the difference between
the post-default market value of the bond and the face value of the bond. Thus, a bond that is
trading substantially below or above par before default cannot be effectively hedged by a single
CDS contract. Also, the protection buyer has the option to deliver the cheapest of several candidate
bonds, which may affect the CDS-bond basis of the other deliverable bonds. The second is because
of market frictions, particularly relating to the costs of short selling a bond, which may render the
CDS price a noisy, and perhaps even biased, measure of credit risk.
A second approach, proposed by Longstaff et al. (2005), is to apply a theoretical model of
credit risk to price both the CDS and the corporate bonds simultaneously. This latter method
has the advantage that any potential biases are addressed explicitly. However, the procedure is
dependent on the choice of the credit risk model. The literature on credit risk models demonstrates
that there remain significant pricing errors in all the models that have been used so far.15
Most market participants use a third method called the par-equivalent CDS spread of the bond,
in order to compute the basis. This method adjusts for deviations of the bond value from par value
so as to make the spread of the bond comparable with a CDS contract. We use this method in
14This problem exists even with cash settlement, since the settlement price is established based on polling dealers
for quotes. See Jankowitsch et al. (2007) for details.
15See Huang and Huang (2003) and Eom et al. (2003) for tests of a range of credit risk pricing models.
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this paper.16 The method is model-independent in the sense that it does not require the explicit
calibration of a model of credit risk because it assumes that the term structure of credit spreads
is flat. While this assumption could affect our results, CDS contracts are often not available for
a maturity point other than five years for many of the issuers in our dataset. Hence, controlling
for the slope of the term structure using CDS contracts of other maturities would involve a drastic
reduction in the size of the sample by biasing it toward the most actively traded issuers. Instead,
we control for maturity effects by including a control for maturity in our regressions. Details of the
methodology for computing the par CDS equivalent spread are provided in Appendix A. According
to our methodology, the CDS-bond basis is defined by the following equation:
Basis = CDSactual − CDShypothetical
where CDSactual is the actual market spread of a CDS contract on a given issuer, and CDShypothetical
is the spread on a hypothetical CDS contract at par that has the same default risk and recovery
rate as implied by the price of a risky corporate bond issued by the same issuer.
Following Grinblatt (2001) and Longstaff et al. (2005), as well as standard market practice,
we use the USD-LIBOR swap curve as a measure of the risk-less rate in our par-equivalent spread
computation, i.e., the spread between the yield on a par-equivalent bond and the benchmark rate.17
This curve is available from Datastream. We linearly interpolate between points on the swap curve
to obtain the corresponding discount factors at semi-annual intervals, for the purpose of computing
the par-equivalent spreads.
An important issue for us to address here is the issue of shorting costs. When the CDS-bond
basis is negative, an appropriate arbitrage strategy would involve holding the bond and buying
protection on it through the CDS contract to maturity. This has the effect of hedging away the
credit risk in the bond, while earning the non-default component, absent liquidity costs. On the
other hand, if the basis is positive, the arbitrage strategy involves “shorting” the bond and selling
protection on it through the CDS contract. Selling corporate bonds short is costly because corporate
bonds are difficult to “find” in the securities borrowing and lending market.18 Typically, a rebate
rate is paid on the cash collateral that is used to borrow a bond, and if this rebate rate is less than
the repurchase rate on general collateral in the market, it constitutes a cost to an agent that shorts
16We ignore differences between day count conventions between corporate bonds and the CDS contracts. Accrued
interest on corporate bonds is usually computed using the NASD’s 30/360 convention, while that on CDS contracts
is computed with an actual/360 convention. This difference is, on average, less than 1 basis point and applies to all
corporate bonds. Thus, it would be absorbed in the constant term in our regressions. In any event, the coefficients
of the independent variables in our regressions will not be systematically biased due to this approximation.
17In previous drafts of the paper, we used both the swap curve and the US Treasury curve as benchmarks. While
the results for the two alternative benchmarks are qualitatively similar, liquidity effects in the Treasury curve may
themselves affect our results. The disadvantage of using the swap curve as a benchmark is that swaps themselves
carry some credit risk, and hence, may slightly underestimate the credit spread implied in the corporate bond yield.
We believe that the latter is likely to be a smaller effect than the liquidity effect in the US Treasury curve.
18See Duffie (1996) and Duffie et al. (2002b) for details of the implications of “shorting” costs.
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a bond. The shorting cost is priced into the bond, and constitutes a price premium.
From the above discussion, it would be useful to account for shorting costs, particularly when
the basis is positive, in our analysis. We were able to obtain access to a data-set for realized
borrowing costs; unfortunately this data-set covers only a small part of our sample period and
our analysis was somewhat restricted. However, in this limited sample, we find that “shorting”
corporate bonds is almost always costly, with an average shorting cost of 0.31% (calculated as the
difference between the general collateral (GC) rate and the rebate rate on a bond). Shorting costs
are typically high when there are supply constraints, due to lack of deliverable bonds in the face
of a large “shorting” demand, which might occur when firms are in distress and have high CDS
spreads. Since these costs can be quite high, we would expect the basis to be incorporated into the
yield, and hence the CDS-bond basis, ex-ante.
Since we do not have data on shorting costs for our entire sample, it is difficult to directly
analyze the impact of shorting costs on the CDS-bond basis. Instead, we present indirect evidence
that these costs may be significant, especially for illiquid bonds that are risky. Since illiquid bonds
are likely to be difficult to sell short, illiquid bonds issued by firms that are close to default are
likely to be more expensive than bonds that are liquid. In section 5.5 we show that this is indeed
the case when we measure risk using a number of variables related to default risk. concerned.
4.3 Liquidity in the CDS market
As argued earlier, the CDS price-bond yield spread basis may reflect the relative liquidity of the
corporate bond versus the corresponding CDS. To the extent that the absolute liquidity of the
bond market is what gets priced into the corporate bond yields, it is necessary to account for the
liquidity in the CDS market. As stated earlier, the intuition behind this argument is that the
negative CDS-bond basis represents an investor’s expected return from a strategy that involves
holding a long position in the bond and buying protection on the issuer in the CDS market. Such
an investor is exposed to potential illiquidity in both the CDS and bond markets; for unwinding
the trade, the investor has to find a counter-party to sell the bond and the CDS. Therefore, in
order to account for the liquidity of the CDS market, we study measures of CDS market liquidity
that have an indirect effect on the corporate bond prices, in addition to bond-specific liquidity.
The reason the CDS liquidity has an indirect effect on the bond price is because when the CDS
market is illiquid, it is difficult to execute a negative basis trade. This would reduce the demand
for a bond, which investors would have bought in a negative basis trade and potentially reduce its
price, and decreasing the basis further.
Since the CDS market is fairly liquid, we are able to use transactional measures of liquidity. One
measure of CDS market liquidity is the bid-ask spread. The other is the bid-ask spread normalized
by the CDS mid-price. These two measures have somewhat different implications for transaction
costs. If the bid-ask spread is highly correlated with measurement errors in the CDS prices, it is
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likely to lead to a spurious coefficient when used by itself. On the other hand, the percentage bid-
ask spread is likely to ignore potentially important relationships between CDS prices and liquidity.
We use both the absolute and the percentage bid-ask spreads in our estimation. Additionally, when
the credit markets are highly volatile, there is a considerable amount of arbitrage risk involved in
a CDS-bond trade. As a proxy for this risk, we use the standard deviation of CDS price changes
during the quarter as a CDS market volatility measure that might affect the basis.
4.4 Firm-Specific Effects
If there are no frictions in the CDS and the bond markets, all information regarding default and
recovery rates should be incorporated in both the CDS price and the bond yield spreads. Hence,
we would not expect the CDS-bond basis to depend on firm-specific variables. However, there are
significant frictions in the bond market. On an average, bonds trade with much lower frequencies
than the CDS contracts, and as shown by Blanco et al. (2005), changes in bond yield spreads lag
changes in CDS spreads. While this statement applies to the yield spreads and hence the basis on
any given date, we expect the effects of these lags to be mitigated when we study the average basis
over any long term horizon such as a quarter.
On the other hand, if there are structural reasons which cause the basis to be biased in one
direction, we could expect variables related to credit risk to affect the basis, even over a longer
period. There are four possible structural reasons that might lead to a persistent bias in the
CDS-bond basis:
• The first has to do with the definition of the contracts. Since a buyer of CDS protection gets
a payoff equal to the face value of the bond on default, he stands to lose or gain depending
upon whether the bond is trading at a premium or a discount. This means that relative to
the market values of those bonds, recovery rates on those bonds are implicitly different. The
computation of a par-equivalent CDS yield spread for the bond mitigates this problem to
some degree. Hence, we would not expect the basis to be systematically affected by whether
a bond is trading at par, or is at a premium or a discount, or by firm-level variables.
• The second stems from the fact that the arbitrage between the bond and the CDS contract
is frictionless only in one direction; while it is easy to buy protection and take a long position
in a bond, sellers of protection through the CDS contract can only hedge their exposures
through a costly process of “shorting” the corporate bond, driving to a wedge between the
corporate bond yield spread and the CDS spread. This is likely to be exacerbated just prior
to default, because the demand for the bond from those intending to deliver it into the CDS
contract may outstrip supply, particularly during times of financial distress. This effect,
together with normal “shorting” frictions are likely to make “shorting” even more difficult.
Since investors rationally anticipate this, the price of the bond relative to the CDS contract
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is likely to be high. Moreover, we would expect the basis itself to be higher during times
when default becomes more likely. This is one possible mechanism through which firm-level
credit variables can be expected to affect the basis. A variable that proxies for higher default
risk is likely to cause the bond to be more expensive relative to the CDS, thus increasing
the basis. Additionally, we would expect that firms that face less uncertainty about their
recovery values in the event of default, such as firms with high levels of tangible assets, would
have lower shorting costs, and hence, a lower CDS-bond basis.
• A third explanation, which is somewhat related to the above point about shorting costs is that
diverse agents operate in the two markets and can become capital-constrained at different
times.19 Economically, selling protection through a CDS contract is equivalent in terms of
risk exposure to buying the bond. If a default event causes sellers of protection to become
capital-constrained to a greater extent than investors that typically have a long position in
the corporate bond, then “shorting” frictions will make it impossible for prices between the
two markets to equalize. If investors anticipate this ahead of time, bond prices will again be
higher than those implied by CDS prices. Note, however, that the difference between this
and the previous explanation is about which market correctly incorporates information about
default risk and recovery rates. However, both explanations have the same implication for
the CDS-bond basis.
• The fourth reason is that there is typically a cheapest-to-deliver option implicit in the CDS
contract. The price of the cheapest-to-deliver bond is likely to track the CDS price most
closely.20 Since, by definition, other bonds are more expensive, their bases are positive,
relative to the cheapest-to-deliver bond. Bond prices may have a wider dispersion when there
is greater heterogeneity in investor beliefs about firm value, particularly just prior to default,
and for firms that have lower levels of tangible assets. Even with respect to the cheapest-to-
deliver bond, the CDS price may be higher, reflecting the optionality available to the buyer
of protection. Thus, for all bonds, this optionality again has the same implication for the
CDS-bond basis as the above three other explanations.
If the above factors are true, it is possible that firm-specific variables will also affect the basis.
To test this hypothesis, we use firm-specific data relating to the issuer of the bonds. We collect
data on firm-specific characteristics by matching the available bonds in our sample by their ticker
symbol with firms in the Compustat quarterly database. A wide variety of firm variables have
been used in the literature on default and recovery rates.21 If markets were frictionless, we would
19See, for example, the detailed arguments developed by Brunnermeir and Pedersen (2006)
20For an exposition on issues related to the pricing of the cheapest-to-deliver option in CDS contracts, refer to
Jankowitsch et al. (2007)
21While an exhaustive list of these effects is beyond the scope of this study, the reader is urged to refer to Acharya,
Bharath and Srinivasan (2006) for an exposition and implementation of firm- and industry-level variables.
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not expect these variables to affect the basis, since the CDS price is a more direct proxy of credit
risk than a lagged financial ratio. If, on the other hand, the basis reflects residual credit risk not
captured by the CDS spread for structural reasons, these financial ratios may have an effect on the
basis. The firm-specific variables that we use in our study, also used commonly in credit analysis,
to proxy for the likely frictions in the arbitrage process in the process of “shorting” the bond are:
1. Leverage: The firm’s financial leverage measures the fixed obligation of the firm and is a
likely predictor of financial distress. We define the leverage as the ratio of the book value of
debt to the sum of the book value of debt and the average market value of equity during a
quarter.
2. Tangible Assets: Recovery rates on firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets are
believed to be higher than those with a lower proportion of tangible assets.22 Accordingly,
we include the proportion of property, plant and equipment to total assets in the firm as the
proxy for the tangibility of a firm’s assets. A higher level of tangible assets implies a higher
recovery value in case of default.
3. Current Ratio: Leverage is associated with the long term credit risk of the firm. However,
firms may default on their obligations because they are unable to meet their liabilities in the
short term. To control for this effect, we use the current ratio - the ratio of current assets
to current liabilities (including any debt maturing within the year). A higher current ratio
implies a lower likelihood of default, and higher recovery rates, in the short run.
A point to note here is about financial firms, which are regulated and have high levels of
leverage. An important element of the regulatory framework in financial markets is the implicit
obligation by regulators to step in when a financial crisis unfolds, to prevent financial contagion.
This implicit guarantee makes financial firms different from firms in other industries in so far as
the high levels of leverage do not necessarily have the same impact on the credit risk of financial
firms compared with firms in other industries. In regressions that use firm-specific variables, we
exclude firms in the financial services industry from our sample, using their SIC classification. This
corresponds to reducing the size of our sample by about 50%.
4.5 Covenants and other bond characteristics
The presence or absence of specific covenants in the bond has an important implication for the
basis. In a frictionless market, the CDS market should price in the effect of the covenants on the
cheapest-to-deliver reference obligation issued by the entity. However, different bonds issued by
the same obligor may vary in terms of the extent of protection they offer in case of default, due to
the presence or absence of covenants. Hence, these convenants may affect the relative prices of the
22See, inter alia, Acharya, Bharath and Srinivasan (2006)
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bonds. Additionally bonds with different levels of protection may behave quite differently in the
case of non-default corporate events such as a leveraged buy-out or an acquisition. For example,
leveraged buy-outs hurt sellers of protection on the CDS contract because they make default more
likely. However, holders of bonds may be protected in terms of their seniority vis-a-vis new debt
issued by the acquirer. There may also be features like special put options which allow investors
to sell back the bonds to the issuer in case of an acquisition.23
In addition to covenants, there may be other bond characteristics that might cause differences
in their tax-status and/liquidity. For instance, exchange-listed bonds may be more liquid than those
that are unlisted. In addition, they may be subject to additional regulatory oversight. Alternatively,
some bonds, such as those subject to the European Union savings tax directive may have a different
tax status compared to others.
To address these issues, we obtain an extensive list of covenants and other binary bond char-
acteristics from Bloomberg, and use them in the form of dummy variables for the presence or
absence of a specific covenant. The dummy variables we use, along with their definitions are listed
in Appendix A. We also include a column for the likely effect we expect these dummy variables to
have on the basis, and a brief explanation for why we expect such an effect.
4.6 Summary Statistics
Table 3 presents the summary statistics for the sample of bonds that we obtain after the filtering
process, averaged at the level of the bond. The variables are grouped under three categories: bond
variables, CDS variables, and firm variables. It can be seen that there is considerable variation
in both the latent liquidity measure and the trading volume of the bond (the two main liquidity
variables that we use in the bond market), as well as the CDS-bond basis. The latent liquidity
of bonds in our sample varies between 0 and 10.78. The mean latent liquidity is 0.32 per year,
with a standard deviation of around 0.47 per year. The number of trades per quarter ranges from
a minimum of one trade to a maximum of around 28,000 trades, with a mean of 226 trades per
quarter. The bonds in our sample range from newly issued bonds to twenty-year old bonds, with an
average age of around four years and an average maturity of around seven years, while the ratings
range from the highest grade (AAA) to bonds that have defaulted or are no longer rated.
There is significant variation in the CDS bid-ask spreads, ranging from almost zero to around
29%, indicating that there can be severe liquidity constraints in the CDS market. The firms in our
sample range from those that have no leverage in the previous quarter, to those that are highly
levered with a leverage ratio of almost 1. On an average the firms are financed by about 36% debt.
We also see a significant variation in the current ratio, from 19% to 1,182% and the proportion of
the firm’s fixed assets, from firms that have virtually no fixed assets to firms that almost entirely
23The presence of such covenants may also create situations where the CDS contract is “orphaned” due to the
disappearance of the reference obligations, following their buy-back by the aquiror.
16
consist of fixed assets (94%).
5 Results
5.1 Bond Characteristics, Latent Liquidity and Other Liquidity Metrics
In order to study the relationship between latent liquidity and other bond-specific variables, we
first look at the correlations between latent liquidity and other liquidity-related metrics such as
the trading volume of the bond in any quarter, the number of days on which it is traded, and the
number of trades in the bond, in addition to its issue size and age. The main aim of this exercise
is to confirm that these empirical estimates agree with those presented in Mahanti et al. (2007)
who use a much larger sample of bonds, many of which do not have CDS contracts associated with
them. The correlations between these liquidity measures are shown in table 4.
We find that the age of the bond is negatively correlated with all the other liquidity metrics -
as a bond gets older, its liquidity decreases. The correlations between the number of days traded,
the number of trades and the volume traded are quite high, as is to be expected, since these are
all measures of realized trading activity. The latent liquidity at the beginning of the quarter is
also positively correlated with the measures of realized trading activity in the following quarter.
In other words, the latent liquidity of a bond at the beginning of a period appears to predict the
transaction-based measures of liquidity in the subsequent period.
Additionally, we perform pooled regressions using bond-quarter observations to study how
latent liquidity is affected by bond-specific variables such as coupon, amount outstanding, rating,
age, maturity, as well as CDS market-related variables such as the CDS price (to account for
the effect of credit risk on the latent liquidity) and the CDS bid-ask spread (to account for the
relationship between CDS market liquidity and bond market liquidity).
Table 5 shows the determinants of average latent liquidity for the bonds in our sample. It
shows that the age of the bond is strongly negatively related to latent liquidity - older bonds have
poorer latent liquidity. There are also some clear coupon effects. Higher coupon bonds seem to
have higher latent liquidity as compared to lower coupon bonds. At the same time, bonds with
poorer credit ratings tend to have higher latent liquidity. However, when we control for CDS market
liquidity and firm-specific ratios related to credit risk, it appears that a poorer rating in itself leads
to lower latent liquidity. We can also see that bonds with higher issue sizes tend to be more liquid,
which is intuitively reasonable. Overall, our results confirm the findings of Mahanti et al. (2007),
albeit for a smaller sample of bonds with CDS contracts traded on the issuer.
We next analyze the percentage bid/ask spreads on the CDS contract, in order to investigate
if cross-sectional differences in bond liquidity are driven by CDS market liquidity. We find that
the percentage bid-ask spread on the CDS contract has some explanatory power for the latent
liquidity of the bond. When the percentage bid-ask spread of the CDS contract is higher, the
17
bonds themselves tend to be less liquid. This is over and above the bond-specific liquidity variables
that we mention above. Interestingly, leverage seems to be a strong determinant of latent liquidity.
Bonds issued by highly levered firms tend to be held more by active investors than bonds of firms
with lower leverage, indicating that there are credit clientele effects related to the trading activity
of the agents holding those bonds. This could be because highly levered firms are generally financial
firms, with large amounts of liquid debt outstanding.
5.2 Time-series Behavior of the Aggregate Average Basis
We first examine the behavior of the aggregate average basis across bonds in our sample and
compare it with the aggregate average latent liquidity (the simple average of the latent liquidity of
bonds included in our sample in any quarter) at the beginning of the period.24 This analysis helps
us make qualitative statements about relationships between our various liquidity variables and the
CDS market liquidity, at the aggregate level over time. This is equivalent to treating our sample
as a portfolio and computing the average basis for every quarter, and similar averages of the other
measures. An advantage of this approach is that errors in the measurement of latent liquidity for
individual bonds are unlikely to be correlated across bonds. Hence, portfolio-level average latent
liquidity is significantly less noisy than the latent liquidity of individual bonds.
In this analysis, we restrict ourself to the data after January 1, 2003. This is because prior
to this, the coverage of TRACE extends to only the most liquid bonds in the market, because
of which average liquidity numbers for bonds are inflated. Additionally the standardization of
the CDS contract definitions by the International Swap Dealers Association (ISDA) took place in
January, 2003 and led to a significant increase in CDS market liquidity, and a consequent reduction
in bid-ask spreads in CDS contracts. In our dataset, we observe this significant decrease, and
therefore, do not include data before January 1, 2003.
Figure 1 shows the variation in the aggregate average basis over time, along with the average
latent liquidity of the bonds in the sample at the beginning of the period, for each quarter July
1, 2002 to June 30, 2006. It shows that the average basis of bonds in our sample decreased over
24This measure has an intuitive interpretation in terms of the average turnover of funds. Summing equation 1
over all bonds i, i = 1, 2, ...I, gives us:
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This is equal to the average turnover of funds under the assumption that the ratio of the number of funds to the
number of bonds stays constant over time. It is a measure of aggregate corporate bond market liquidity. However,
this does not necessarily hold for a sub-sample of bonds, such as ours.
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time, and so has the average latent liquidity of the bonds. The graph suggests that there is a
positive correlation between the aggregate latent liquidity and the aggregate average basis of the
bonds in our sample: when the aggregate average liquidity in the market is high, the bonds trade
at lower yield spreads, relative to the corresponding CDS prices. Figure 2 shows the variation in
the aggregate average basis in relation to the aggregate average trade count of bonds in a given
quarter in our sample. While the figure suggests that there is a positive correlation between trading
activity and the basis, the relationship seems to be less clear-cut for trade count than that for latent
liquidity, suggesting that the latter variable is more informative about bond prices and yields.
5.3 Determinants of the CDS-Bond Basis
Section 5.2 suggests that there is a positive relationship between the aggregate average basis and
aggregate average latent liquidity. Since latent liquidity is measured at a quarterly frequency, it
is difficult to perform a time-series analysis separately for each individual bond, over a four-year
period, especially when there are missing observations for some of them. Instead, we pool all the
observations across bonds and quarters. In order to perform the regressions, we compute the average
quarterly basis for each bond and match it with its latent liquidity at the beginning of the quarter,
along with other bond-specific variables for that quarter. This gives us about 29,000 bond-quarter
observations, with all bond-specific variables included, a small reduction in our sample, from the
approximately 33,000 bonds we had prior to merging the bond-specific characteristics into our
data-set. The pooled regression estimates are consistent as long as the standard errors are adjusted
for residual correlations within each bond group. To incorporate this adjustment, we use standard
errors, clustered by bond.
5.4 Bond Liquidity
We first perform univariate pooled regressions of the average CDS-bond basis of each bond, during
the quarter, on variables related to the liquidity of the bond, namely its latent liquidity at the
beginning of the quarter, the number of days it traded during a quarter, the number of trades
during the quarter, the logarithm of the traded market value during the quarter, the issue size
of the bond, and the age of the bond at the beginning of the quarter. (The standard errors are
adjusted to account for clustering within bonds.) The results are presented in Table 6.
We find that each of these explanatory variables is statistically significant. An increase in
latent liquidity by one standard deviation leads to an increase in the basis (and a decrease in
the yield of the bond) by ten basis points. An increase in the number of trades by one standard
deviation leads to an increase in the basis by about nine basis points. An increase of one standard
deviation in the number of days traded per quarter leads to an increase of eight basis points in the
average basis. An increase of one standard deviation in the quantity traded leads to an increase of
five basis points in the basis. As bonds age, their basis reduces, leading to higher yields and lower
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prices. An increase of one standard deviation in the age leads to a reduction of about 16 basis
points in the basis. Surprisingly, although issue size by itself leads to an increase in the basis, it is
not statistically significant.
While the univariate relationships are as expected, it is important to see which of these liquidity
variables are significant, once other variables have been accounted for. Specifically, we are interested
in examining if latent liquidity has explanatory power for the CDS-bond basis over and above other
realized liquidity-related variables. We next proceed to investigate this issue in detail. In doing so,
we confirm several empirical findings from the literature and generate new findings of our own.
Table 7 shows the relationship between the CDS-bond basis of individual corporate bonds, the
bond-specific characteristics and liquidity for a range of alternate specifications that include latent
liquidity and other bond-specific liquidity measures, CDS market-specific effects and firm-level
financial variables. In all the specifications presented in the table, latent liquidity has significant
explanatory power for the basis, even after the inclusion of realized trading activity. This finding
indicates that the liquidity premium of a bond is determined not only by the actual trading activity
in the bond, measured by transaction metrics, but also by the pattern of investors holding the bond
in terms of their potential trading activity, as proxied by the latent liquidity measure. This evidence
provides strong support for the hypothesis that there is extra information related to liquidity in the
latent liquidity measure, and that it is priced in the corporate bonds. On an average, an increase
of one standard deviation in the latent liquidity seems to increase the basis by 10 bps, or reduce
bond yields by around ten bps. Between the most liquid decile and least liquid decile of bonds in
our sample, this indicates a difference of 1% in yield, an economically significant difference.
The significant coefficient of the coupon rate variable persists even after the inclusion of a
large number of liquidity-related variables. Traditionally, as in Elton et al. (2001), this relationship
has been explained as a tax effect. However, as has been argued more recently by Longstaff et al.
(2005), the tax treatment on coupon income and swap rates is the same, and therefore, one would
not expect to find a tax effect the difference between corporate bond yields and the swap rates.
The fact that part of the coupon effect remains even when swap rates are used as the benchmark
indicates that this explanation can only be partly true, at best.25 In addition, there is anecdotal
evidence that many of the participants in the corporate bond markets, such as long term pension
funds, are tax-exempt. Even hedge-funds, which in recent years have become significant players
in the CDS and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO) markets, as well as the corporate bond
market directly, tend to be tax-neutral between income and capital gains. Given the large sizes
of these two segments of the market, it is difficult to conclude that the marginal investor in the
corporate bond market has a strong tax preference.
25The values of the coefficient of the coupon rate in the case of swap and treasury rates are similar as documented
by Longstaff et al. (2005), as well as in empirical tests using our dataset (not reported here), with swap and treasury
rates as benchmarks. This evidence casts doubt on the conventional explanation of the coupon effect as being due to
differential taxation of corporate versus treasury bonds.
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A larger amount outstanding of a bond tends to increase the CDS-bond basis, and makes the
bond more expensive, thus increasing the CDS-bond basis. This is because bonds with larger issue
sizes are likely to be more liquid relative to bonds with smaller issue sizes, even after controlling for
latent liquidity, and hence have lower transaction costs. Older bonds are likely to be less liquid than
newer bonds. The typical explanation for this is that older bonds get “locked up in the portfolios
of passive investors. Since latent liquidity is a far more direct measure of this effect, we expect
that after controlling for latent liquidity, we should not expect age to have a significant effect on
the basis. The results lend support to this hypothesis. Although the coefficient of age in the first
two regressions is positive, its sign changes after the inclusion of firm level effects, indicating that
age, in itself, is not a good measure of liquidity, and that latent liquidity is a better measure of the
“locking-away” effect than is age.
The relationship between the basis and the number of trades in the bond is also significant.
Note that the number of trades is a measure of the realized liquidity of the bond. As expected, it
has a positive coefficient in the first two regressions. It should be noted that for every time period,
latent liquidity is available ex-ante, whereas the realized trading volume is an ex-post measure of
liquidity. Thus, latent liquidity can be used to predict the non-default component in the bonds, as
opposed to trading volume, which is only available ex-post or, at best contemporaneously, with the
basis.
5.5 Interaction between bond-liquidity and default risk
Our hypothesis is that the expected costs of selling a bond short are important drivers of the
CDS-bond basis, especially for firms that are close to default, when uncertainty about the value of
the bonds is greater. Since illiquid bonds are also expected to be difficult to sell short, we expect
illiquid bonds issued by firms with a high level of credit risk to be expensive, relative to more liquid
bonds. In other words, while liquidity serves to increase the price of bonds in most cases, we expect
the opposite to hold true for the most illiquid bonds belonging to highly risky firms. To examine
whether this is indeed the case, we perform “double sorts” on our portfolio along the liquidity and
default risk dimensions. Specifically, for every quarter in our data, we form twenty-five groups
of bonds, using liquidity and a variety of other variables - including the leverage of the firm, the
average spread on the CDS contract, and ratings related to default risk as the sorting variable - and
examine the average basis in each bucket. The results for these “double sorts for four combinations,
involving two liquidity variables and two default risk variables, are presented in tables 11, 12, 13
and 14.
Table 11 shows the average basis, along with the standard estimate of the mean average basis
for that subgroup when the sample is sorted along the dimension of latent liquidity and rating
class. In order to construct this table, for each quarter, we first sort the observations in our dataset
into quintiles by latent liquidity. Next, we create subgroups for each quintile on the basis of rating-
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class, and pool the sub-groups across quarters. We estimate the mean basis in each sub-group
and the standard error for the estimate. The standard errors are clustered to reflect the fact that
each sub-group contains multiple observations for the same bond, from different quarters. Two
phenomena are apparent from the results. First, as we go toward progressively worse ratings, the
CDS-bond basis increases. This means that bonds become more and more expensive relative to the
CDS contracts. Moreover, for rating classes up to BBB, an increase in the latent liquidity of the
bonds leads to an increase in the basis - that is, liquid bonds are more expensive. This also follows
from the results of the pooled regressions mentioned above. Second, for poorer credit rating classes,
which indicate that the firms are closer to default, the illiquid bonds have a substantially higher
basis than the liquid bonds. The most illiquid bonds for the riskiest firms (those belonging to latent
liquidity quintile 1) are expensive. As liquidity increases, the bonds tend to become cheaper, and
finally the most liquid bonds of the riskiest firms (those belonging to latent liquidity quintile 5) are
again more expensive relative to less liquid bonds (e.g. those belonging to latent liquidity quintile
4). In other words, in the poorer rating classes, liquidity serves to make the bond cheaper relative
to the CDS contracts.
Table 12 shows the results of a similar analysis when the trading volume of the bonds is used
as a measure of liquidity. Table 13 show the results when bonds are sorted according to latent
liquidity on the liquidity dimension and the leverage of the firms issuing the bonds on the default
risk dimension. Table 13 shows the result when trading volume for the quarter is used as a measure
of liquidity and leverage is used as a measure of default risk. In all these cases, the conclusion can
be drawn that while liquidity serves to increase the price of a corporate bond relative to the CDS
contract, illiquid bonds of highly risky firms are also more expensive.
In order to ensure that the results of the double sort are robust to the inclusion of other
variables, we also perform regressions using two interaction variables. Table 9 presents these results.
In addition to the bond and firm specific variables that are used in subsection 5.4, we include the
following two interaction dummies. The first takes a value of 1 if the bond lies in the lowest latent
liquidity quintile referred to in table 11 and the highest quintile of risk as measured by the CDS
spread. The second dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the bond lies in the lowest liquidity quintile
as measured by trading volume and the highest quintile of default risk. Both interaction dummies
turn out to have positive and statistically significant coefficients, both when taken independently
and when taken together. In general, illiquid bonds of highly risky firms tend to have a CDS-bond
basis that is higher by 60 basis points than would be expected if the interaction terms were not
included.
Our explanation for this finding is market segmentation and limits to arbitrage. A lower latent
liquidity implies that a particular bond is held by buy-and-hold investors, and is less likely to be “in
the market.” The valuations of these investors may not be the same as that of a typical participant,
in the CDS market for the same bond, who is likely to have a short term horizon, and thus, have a
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valuation that is more sensitive to short term fluctuations in default risk. Since illiquid bonds can
also be expected to be difficult to sell short, arbitrageurs are unable to correct for the difference in
valuations between the corporate bond market and the CDS market, thus making illiquid bonds of
highly risky firms more expensive than more liquid bonds. The observed pattern in the CDS-bond
basis and liquidity for risky firms mirrors the pattern for the costs of short selling documented in
Nashikkar and Pedersen (2007), although for a different sample of bonds.
5.6 CDS Market Effects
In addition to bond-specific liquidity effects, we find that the bid-ask spread in the CDS market
has explanatory power for the basis, over and above the liquidity of the bond in itself. This is
noteworthy, because it indicates that liquidity in the CDS market affects the prices of bonds in the
cross-section. This is a phenomenon that has not been documented in the previous literature. Our
results show that both bond market and CDS market liquidity variables have a strong effect on
the CDS-bond basis. In fact, an increase by one basis point in the CDS bid-ask spread leads to an
increase of two basis points in the CDS-bond basis. This indicates that bonds are relatively more
expensive compared to the CDS contracts, when the CDS market liquidity is low. There are two
possible explanations for this. First, less liquidity in the CDS market is likely to drive investors
toward the corporate bond market, making bonds relatively more expensive. There is some support
for this explanation. Figure 3 shows the relationship between the average bid-ask spread in the
CDS market and the average trade count of bonds in our sample in any given quarter. It is apparent
from the figure that as the CDS market has become more liquid, average trading volume in the
bond market has actually decreased. Second, episodes of poor liquidity in the CDS market are
often connected with negative news about the issuers on whom the CDS contracts are traded. It
is generally difficult to “short” corporate bonds, which leads to corporate bonds becoming more
expensive relative to the CDS contracts on the respective issues particularly during illiquid periods,
in the market as a whole. Unfortunately, in the absence of detailed data on shorting costs, we have
no clear way of distinguishing between these two hypotheses.
We find, however, that a higher percentage bid-ask spread on the CDS contract leads to a lower
basis. However, this effect seems to be related to the credit risk of the issuer, as the inclusion of firm-
level financial ratios eliminates the explanatory power of the percentage bid-ask spread. The above
results are interesting because they show that the CDS market liquidity has explanatory power for
bond yield spreads, over and above bond-specific liquidity variables, thus providing evidence of a
liquidity spill-over effects from the CDS market into the bond-market.
We include the CDS market volatility as a control for the riskiness of the CDS market. We
find that the basis is negatively related to CDS market volatility, after controlling for other factors.
Higher volatility in the CDS market makes a bond cheaper relative to the CDS contract, indicating
that a strategy of buying the bond and buying protection on it in the CDS market has higher
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returns when the volatility of the CDS spread is high, indicating that a part of the CDS-bond basis
is compensation for this risk.
5.7 Firm-Specific Effects
As argued earlier, if the CDS price completely accounts for the credit risk of the issuer, we would
not expect firm-specific financial variables, such as leverage and the percentage of tangible assets
on the balance sheet, to have any effect on the CDS-bond basis. However, we find that these
firm-specific variables, measured at the end of the prior quarter, have strong explanatory power for
the basis. This finding can either mean that some of these variables affect the basis through other
channels such as liquidity, or more plausibly, that the credit risk of the bond is not fully captured
in the price of the CDS contract, because of frictions that exist in the arbitrage between the CDS
market and the bond market.
In performing our analysis of firm-specific effects, we exclude firms in the financial services
industry from the sample. This is because financial firms are highly regulated and have high
leverage ratios by design. Hence, financial leverage does not have as much of an implication on
their credit risk, as that of non-financial firms. This basic difference in the characteristics of the
firms makes it difficult to compare them to firms in other industries. Financial firms make up
about 40% of our sample, which is consistent with the proportion of financial firms in the overall
corporate bond universe.26 Removing them from the sample ensures that the results are not driven
by the high leverage ratios of financial firms.
In the sub-sample of non-financial firms, the leverage ratio of the issuer, computed as the ratio
of long term debt to the sum of long term debt and market value of equity of the firm, turns
out to have a significant explanatory power on the basis. Firms with high leverage tend to have
substantially higher CDS-bond basis than firms with low leverage. This effect seems to be clearly
related to credit risk, as the inclusion of leverage drives away any explanatory power that the
rating of the firms have. This indicates that bonds issued by highly leveraged firms tend to be
more expensive relative to their CDS contracts. The most plausible explanation for this are the
difficulty of selling these bonds short because of frictions in the market for borrowing and lending
corporate bonds, and a segmentation between corporate bond and CDS markets. In other words,
holders of corporate bonds may have different beliefs about default probabilities and recovery rates,
as compared to agents who trade in the CDS market, but arbitrage between these two markets is
costly.
While the current ratio does not seem to be particularly significant, the proportion of property,
plant and equipment to total assets, which is used as a measure of the firms tangible assets has a
strong negative coefficient. A firm with higher tangible assets has a lower basis. This is perhaps
because firms with higher tangible assets are likely to suffer from a lower uncertainty about firm
26For example, refer Mahanti et al. (2007)
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values in the event of default, leading to lower shorting costs, and thus, a lower basis.
5.8 The effects of bond covenants
Bonds are unique and have several distinguishing characteristics, particularly covenants that make
them different from the CDS contract in terms of credit risk. In this section, we look at how the
characteristics of these covenants affect their basis. The full list of these covenants, along with
their definitions and the expected signs of the coefficients, is given in Appendix A. The results
reported in table 8, represent the coefficients of the dummy variables associated with each covenant
in a pooled regression, controlling for the bond specific, firm-specific, and CDS market variables
included above. Note that the coefficients reported in table 8 are obtained using a regression where
the dependent variable is the basis and not the yield spread of the bond itself - that is, credit risk
as measured by the CDS price for the same issuer has already been controlled for.
We find that credit-sensitive bonds have a higher basis (are more expensive) by almost ten
basis points, on average, compared to other bonds, although this effect is not statistically significant.
Bonds that have an option to be defeased have a lower basis by up to eight basis points. Defeasance
is the process whereby the issuer of the security sets aside cash in order to redeem the security.
Defeasance thus serves to decrease the credit risk of a bond, and in doing so, acts as a signal
to investors in the bond. A defeasance option allows the issuer of a bond to set-aside cash for
the purpose of buying back the bond, when it is advantageous for the issuer to do so. One would
normally expect defeased bonds to be more expensive relative to other bonds. We find the opposite,
and puzzling result. This seems to indicate that a defeasance option serves as a signal that the
issuer of the bond is of higher risk. In other words, if firms that are more likely to default have a
higher likelihood of having defeasance options, investors would see that as a negative signal, and
this would make the bonds cheaper relative to other bonds. We confirm this by looking at the types
of firms that have defeasance as an option, and find that these are indeed primarily high leverage,
poor credit rating firms. Therefore, defeasance is associated with firms of poorer credit quality,
and hence, a higher CDS-bond basis.
Bonds subject to the European Union (E.U.) Savings Tax Directive tend to have a lower basis
of almost 20 basis points, indicating that they are cheaper. E.U. savings taxes apply to all publicly
issued bonds issued after July, 2001, and held by an investor based in the E.U. and dependent
countries. There are two possible interpretations for this effect. It could indicate some non-linearity
of the basis with respect to age (since these taxes apply only to bonds issued after the year 2001,
and hence are newer). Alternately, it could be because the marginal investors of these bonds are
based in tax havens such as the Cayman Islands that are now subject to the increased taxes. Bonds
that have an equity claw-back provision are cheaper by about 12 basis points, although this effect
is not significant. This is somewhat surprising, since equity claw-back provisions afford a higher
degree of protection to the debt-holders in the event of the firm getting taken over, and increasing
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its leverage. Secured bonds have a higher basis of up to 26 basis points as compared to unsecured
bonds, indicating that they are more expensive. This is intuitive because secured bonds have a
higher degree of collateral protection against unsecured bonds, and the benchmark CDS contracts
that we use for comparison have senior unsecured debt as the deliverable obligation.
Similarly bonds that have third party guarantees also have a higher basis, although this effect is
only marginally significant, statistically speaking. Exchange-listed bonds seem to have a marginally
higher basis (although not significant) and could point to greater liquidity of bonds that are listed on
an exchange vis a vis those that are not listed. This is because exchanges offer an additional venue
for trading compared to the over-the-counter market for corporate bonds. Funded bonds (bonds
where the issuer has the obligation to partly redeem the bond before maturity) seem to have a
higher basis and are expensive relative to the CDS contract. This effect is marginally significant.
This could be because the implicit credit risk in a funded bond is lower than that in non-funded
bond. Surprisingly, the inclusion of special put options related to asset sales or acquisitions does
not seem to have a significant effect on the basis. It is possible that these have any value only
when there is a high likelihood of a corporate event such as a takeover. Tax-related call options
seem to make the bonds marginally more expensive relative to other bonds. Overall, the signs of
the coefficients in the regression with bond characteristics are consistent with the hypotheses listed
in Appendix A with the exception of the defeasance option, for which the explanation may be due
the fact that firms of poorer credit quality typically go in for this option.
6 Conclusion
The existing literature on the yield spread of US corporate bonds argues that the non-default
component of corporate yields may be related to factors associated with liquidity, such as age,
outstanding amount and maturity. However, since liquidity metrics based on transaction prices
and volumes are difficult to compute due to infrequent trading in the corporate bond market, this
conjecture is difficult to confirm at the level of individual bonds. We use a uniquely constructed
data-set from one of the largest corporate bond custodians in the market to evaluate the ease of
access of a bond using a recently developed measure called latent liquidity. We also use transactions
data for the corporate bond market obtained from FINRA’s TRACE database to compute a range
of realized liquidity measures for corporate bonds and show that latent liquidity has explanatory
power, over and above these measures in explaining the non-default component of yield spreads.
We use the CDS-bond basis, which is the difference between the CDS price of a bond and its par
equivalent credit spread, as a measure of the non-default component.
First, we confirm several relationships documented in the previous literature on the effect of
factors like coupon, amount outstanding, age and trading volume on liquidity in the corporate
bond market, on a much more current and extensive data-set, and in particular, on the latent
liquidity measure. Second, we show that the average level of the CDS-bond basis is related to the
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liquidity of the bonds: Liquid bonds tend to be more expensive when evaluated against their CDS
contracts than illiquid bonds. However, for highly risky and highly illiquid bonds, we show that the
relationship reverses. These bonds tend to be more expensive relative to their CDS contracts as
compared to more liquid bonds of the same risk. We believe that this is because of limited arbitrage
associated with the difficulty of “shorting” corporate bonds. Third, at the level of individual bonds,
we show that latent liquidity has explanatory power for the CDS-bond basis, over and above what
can be captured either by bond characteristics such as coupon, amount outstanding and age, or by
realized measures of liquidity such as the observed trading volume in the bond.
We present a new result that shows that the liquidity of the CDS contract, as measured both
by the bid-ask spread, and the riskiness of the CDS market, as measured by the CDS market
volatility, have explanatory power for the basis of bonds, over and above bond-specific liquidity
variables. This is evidence that bond market participants account for the liquidity of the CDS
market when they price corporate bonds, due to the ease of hedging their positions. Accordingly,
as the CDS market becomes more and more liquid, we expect the CDS-bond basis to decrease over
time.
We also demonstrate that the CDS price does not fully account for the effect of credit risk on
bond prices - there are several firm-level effects related to credit risk that seem to have explanatory
power over the CDS bond basis, even after we account for the differences between bonds that arise
because of liquidity. We also show that cross-sectional variations in the CDS-bond basis of different
bonds may arise due to varying levels of protection afforded by covenants, listing, and tax status,
among other factors.
In conclusion, we present and validate a measure of corporate bond liquidity that is available at
the beginning of the trading period, rather than contemporaneously, does not require transaction
data, has additional explanatory power, and offers interesting insights into processes that drive
liquidity in the market for credit risk. In doing so, we generate several new stylized facts on the
factors that affect the yields on corporate bonds.
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Appendix A
Covenant Number of bonds Definition Expected effect on basis
Credit Sensitive 38 The bond’s coupon is linked to
credit rating
Positive (Greater protection)
Defeased 3323 The bond has an option to be de-
feased in the future, i.e. the is-
suer may set aside funds for the
bondholders and free himself from
covenants
Positive/Negative (Issuer has the
option to defease, defeasement itself
increases basis)
Equity Clawback 39 The issuer has an option to redeem
the security using equity proceeds
Positive (Greater protection)
Eusd Tax 3611 The bond is subject to the E.U. Sav-
ings tax directive applying to bonds
issued after July 2001
Negative (Bonds are older and at-
tract higher tax rates)
Exch Listed 666 Is Exchange listed Positive (More liquidity and over-
sight)
Fund Terms 84 The issuer has the obligation to re-
deem the bond in part before matu-
rity
Positive (Greater protection)
Guarantee 626 Is Guaranteed Positive (Greater Protection)
Poison Put 192 Indicates the presence of a put op-
tion by investors or a call option
by the issuer in case of ownership
change
Positive (Greater protection)
Prin Idx Lnk 103 Indicates if the principal amount
fluctuates with a market index
Unclear
Prosp On File 5203 The prospectus is on file with the
SEC
Positive (Higher liquidity and over-
sight)
Secured 253 The bond is secured by collateral Positive (Greater protection)
Spec Put 1623 The presence of a special put option
in case of a corporate event like a
spinoff or an asset sale
Positive (Greater protection)
Tap Issue 1479 The bond may be reissued Unclear
Tax Call 700 The security may be called if there
are changes in tax laws
Positive/Negative (The option may
or may not benefit the issuer at the
expense of the investors)
Table 1: The table above shows the list of individual bond characteristics used as dummy variables in our study of a
sample of 5,692 bonds issued by 1,167 issuers that have CDS contracts associated with the issuer from July 2002 to
June 2006. All the bonds considered above are traded on NASD’s TRACE reporting system and database. The first
column shows the name of the characteristic for which the corresponding dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the
characteristic is present, and zero otherwise. The second column shows the number of bonds with that characteristic
in our sample. The third column includes a brief explanation for the dummy variable we expect in explaining the
bond yields and hence, the CDS-bond basis, and the fourth column shows the sign we expect for the coefficient of
the dummy variable, and a brief explanation for why this is the case.
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Appendix B
Computation of the Par-Equivalent Bond Yield Spread and the CDS-Bond Basis
Consider the following notation:
N : Remaining coupon periods
ti: Time of ith coupon period, in years, i = 1, , N
ProbSurv(t): Probability of surviving till time t
ProbDef(t): Probability of defaulting at time t
δ(t): day-count convention between ti-1 and ti
P0: Market price of the bond at valuation date
D(t): Risk-free discount factor to time t (using LIBOR swap curve)
λ: Default intensity or the mean arrival rate of default
c: Coupon
F : Face value
r: Constant (assumed) recovery rate
Our par-equivalent bond yield spread computation assumes that
• Defaults can take place only on the coupon payment dates.
• The default intensity is constant, i.e., the term structure of default rates for any issuer is flat.
• The recovery rate as a proportion of face value in the event of default is constant.
Using the notation above, we have:
P0 = c
n∑
i=1
δtie
−λtiD(ti) + Fe−λtND(tN ) + r
n∑
i=1
e−λ(ti−1−ti)D(ti) (B-1)
Thus, given the price of the bond, we can solve for the constant default intensity λ. Next,
consider a hypothetical CDS contract, at par, that has the same default probability as the bond.
The following holds at initiation:
PV (feeleg) = PV (contingentleg) (B-2)
where the left hand side is the present value of the expected fees to be earned on the hypothetical
CDS contract, and the right hand side is the present value of the expected payment to be made in
case default occurs.
Thus, the bond is equivalent to a hypothetical par CDS contract with the following spread.
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ParCDSequivalentspread =
(1− rr)∑ni=1 e−λ(ti−1−ti)D(ti)∑n
i=1 δtie
−λtiD(ti) +
∑n
i=1
δti
2 e
−λ(ti−1−ti)D(ti)
(B-3)
The CDS-bond basis is simply computed as the difference between the above spread and the
spread on an actual CDS contract trading in the market.
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Credit Rating Lehman State Street Sample
Credit Universe Holdings
As % Of Total As % Of Total As % Of Total
Aaa 5.72% 7.55% 8.01%
Aa 16.19% 19.92% 11.60%
A 23.88% 22.83% 40.28%
Baa 23.88% 23.51% 31.51%
Ba 7.25% 7.37% 6.11%
B 9.58% 10.94% 2.279%
Caa 3.86% 3.70% 0.208%
C 3.10% 1.29% -
Other or NA Grade 6.55% 2.88%
Total 100% 100% 100%
Table 2: Distribution of bonds by Moody’s initial credit rating: This table presents the composition, by credit
rating, as defined by Moodys, of US corporate bonds outstanding, as estimated by Bloomberg, as of December 2004.
The first column defines the nine credit rating categories, and the second and third columns show the decomposition
for the overall universe and for State Street holdings respectively. The fourth column shows the decomposition for
our sample. The last column indicates the relative amount in the custody of State Street Corporation, as a fraction
of total US dollar amounts outstanding, in each credit rating category.
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Figure 1: Average latent liquidity and the CDS-bond basis over time: This plot shows the average
latent liquidity of the sample of bonds and the associated CDS-bond basis relative to swap rates over the
period from July 2002 to July 2006. The sample consists of around 5,792 bonds issued by 1,217 issuers,
consisting of about 33,000 bond-quarter observations. Not all bonds are traded in every quarter. Latent
liquidity is a liquidity measure that weights the turnover of funds holding the bond by their fractional
holdings of the bond. The basis is computed as the difference between the CDS price and the par-equivalent
CDS spread of the corresponding bond. CDS prices are from a combination of data obtained from GFI
Group Inc (prior to October 2004) and CMA Datavision (after October 2004). Bond prices and trade counts
are obtained as volume-weighted averages from NASD’s TRACE database.
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Figure 2: Trade count and the CDS-bond basis over time: This plot shows the average number of
quarterly trades of the sample of bonds and the associated CDS-bond basis over the period from July 2002
to June 2006. The sample consists of around 5,792 bonds issued by 1,167 issuers, consisting of about 33,000
bond-quarter observations. Not all bonds are traded in every quarter. Latent liquidity is a liquidity measure
that weights the turnover of funds holding the bond by their fractional holdings of the bond. The basis is
computed as the difference between the CDS price and the par-equivalent CDS spread of the corresponding
bond. CDS prices are from a combination of data obtained from GFI Group Inc (prior to October 2004)
and CMA Datavision (after October 2004). Bond prices and trade counts are obtained as volume weighted
averages from NASD’s TRACE database.
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Figure 3: Trade count and the average CDS bid-ask spread over time: This plot shows the average
quarterly trade count in the sample of bonds and the average bid-ask spread for the corresponding CDS
contracts in a sample of around 5,792 bonds issued by around 1,167 issuers, consisting of about 33,000
bond-quarter observations, in the period from July 2002 to June 2006. the CDS bid-ask spread data is
computed using two sources: Data before 10/01/2004 are from GFI Group Inc, while data after 10/01/2004
are obtained from CDS prices published by CMA on Bloomberg. The trade count data for bonds is from
trades reported on the NASD’s TRACE database.
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Bond variables
Coupon 6.14 1.63 0.00 13.50
Age (yrs) 4.42 3.59 0.00 20.56
Maturity (yrs) 7.18 8.59 0.04 40.26
Latent Liquidity 0.32 0.47 0.00 10.78
No. of trades (100) 2.26 6.68 0.01 281.66
S&P Rating 8.47 3.50 0.00 20.00
Issue Size (USD mio) 0.46 0.58 0.01 6.50
CDS variables
CDS price(bps) 77.02 152.67 2.00 5920.71
CDS bid-ask (bps) 6.47 25.46 0.00 2935.54
Par equivalent spread (bps) 45.13 161.42 -37.28 7171.46
Basis (bps) 41.14 104.04 -620.87 5738.27
Firm Variables
Leverage 0.36 0.21 0.00 0.98
Current Ratio 1.20 0.51 0.19 11.82
Tangible Assets 0.27 0.25 0.00 0.94
Table 3: This table shows the summary statistics of the the basis, the par equivalent spread, the CDS price,
age, maturity, trade count, rating, issue size, CDS bid ask spreads, firm leverage, current ratios and the
percentage of tangible assets of the firm for the set of bonds in our sample. The sample consists of around
5,792 bonds issued by 1,167 firms on whom CDS contracts are actively traded from the period from July
2002 to June 2006. The prices of the bonds used for computation of the par equivalent spreads are from the
NASD-TRACE database. We compute the volume weighted average price for the day in our par equivalent
spread computation, and compute a basis by subtracting it from the CDS price for the day (if available).
The CDS prices prior to 01 Oct 2004 are from GFI Group Inc, while the ones used after 01 Oct 2004 are
from CMA (via the Bloomberg data service). We compute quarterly averages of the basis, forming quarterly
bond observations. The realized trade count is from TRACE. Latent liquidity is based on custodial holdings
at a the largest custodian int the market. For issuer rating, we use the quarterly rating as available from
Compustat. The financial ratios are based on information as reported in the quarter previous to the one for
which we compute the average basis.
Latent Liquidity Trade Count Traded Market Value Days traded Age Amount O/s
Latent Liquidity 1.00
Trade Count 0.20 1.00
Traded Market Value 0.25 0.72 1.00
Days traded 0.34 0.52 0.51 1.00
Age -0.03 -0.11 -0.19 -0.25 1.00
Amount O/s 0.34 0.31 0.35 0.64 0.01 1.00
Table 4: Correlations between liquidity related variables in the sample: This table shows the
correlations between various bond specific liquidity variables such as the amount outstanding, age, the
number of days traded within a quarter, the number of trades within a quarter and the total market value
traded withing a quarter and latent liquidity. This sample has a total of 43,258 bond-quarter observations
consisting of 5,792 bonds issued by 1,167 firms during the period July 2002 to June 2006. The data for trading
activity uses all trades greater than USD 100,000 as reported on TRACE. Latent liquidity is computed from
the holdings data of the largest custodian in the corporate bond market.
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Latent Liquidity
Coupon 0.021 0.037 0.022
(4.14)** (7.19)** (2.75)**
Age (yrs) -0.011 -0.016 -0.009
(5.43)** (7.89)** (3.20)**
S&P Rating 0.004 -0.010 -0.008
(2.61)** (4.11)** (1.74)
Log (Issue Size) 0.086 0.093 0.107
(32.65)** (36.32)** (25.74)**
Maturity (yrs) -0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.44) (1.20) (0.09)
Pct CDS Bid-ask -0.267 -0.281
(4.37)** (3.30)**
CDS price 0.000 -0.000
(1.52) (1.36)
Leverage 0.347
(4.85)**
Current Ratio -0.060
(3.45)**
Tangible Assets -0.133
(3.33)**
Constant -0.836 -0.789 -0.835
(32.03)** (25.07)** (13.07)**
Observations 37229 28647 14744
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.12
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 5: Latent Liquidity and bond-specific variables in the sample of traded bonds: This table
shows the results of a pooled regression of latent liquidity on various bond specific factors, such as coupon,
rating, amount outstanding and age, CDS market liquidity factors such as the percentage bid-ask spread in
the CDS contract, and firm-specific variables such as leverage, current ratio and the percentage of tangible
assets. The sample is an unbalanced quarterly panel consisting of 5,792 bonds issued by 1,167 firms, obtained
by matching volume-weighted traded prices on TRACE with CDS prices on the names issuing those bonds,
from July 2002 to June 2006. Figures in brackets are clustered standard errors where the clustering is done
by bond.
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Basis (bps)
Latent Liquidity 19.456
(9.05)**
No. of trades (100) 1.430
(7.09)**
Days Traded 0.454
(7.32)**
Log (Market Value Traded) 1.511
(2.87)**
Age (yrs) -3.776
(11.26)**
Log (Issue Size) 1.242
(1.63)
Constant 33.507 37.524 31.043 15.653 57.974 25.861
(19.61)** (27.86)** (15.37)** (1.69) (30.27)** (2.70)**
Observations 29949 29949 29949 29949 29949 29949
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 6: Univariate regressions of the basis on bond-specific liquidity related variables: These
regressions show the effect of latent liquidity, amount outstanding, age, number of trades, the number of
days traded during a quarter and the traded market value, on the CDS-bond basis. The swap curve is used
as the risk-less benchmark in computing the par-equivalent bond spreads used to compute the basis.The
basis is averaged for the quarter. The sample consists of around 29,000 bond-quarter observations for 5,792
bonds issued by 1,167 firms, obtained by matching bond prices as reported on TRACE and beginning of
quarter latent liquidities from the custodial database with CDS prices, over the period from July 2002 to
June 2006.
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Dependent variable : Average CDS-Bond basis
Coupon -15.043 -17.112 -8.808 -8.624
(9.66)** (11.62)** (5.81)** (5.14)**
Latent Liquidity 20.985 17.929 10.242 9.852
(11.15)** (10.70)** (4.62)** (4.91)**
No. of trades (100) 1.037 0.646 -0.941 -0.815
(7.44)** (5.53)** (3.19)** (2.75)**
Maturity (yrs) -2.582 -2.481 -2.395 -2.394
(13.44)** (13.56)** (12.46)** (12.54)**
Age (yrs) 0.903 1.323 -0.152 -2.554
(2.01)* (3.13)** (0.34) (4.76)**
Log (Issue Size) 2.662 3.530 10.279 11.300
(3.86)** (5.72)** (11.45)** (6.96)**
S&P Rating 8.037 3.737 -0.616 -0.170
(11.38)** (7.89)** (0.72) (0.21)
CDS Vol 0.054 -0.011 -0.019
(0.99) (0.22) (0.38)
CDS bid-ask 2.209 2.110 2.085
(10.49)** (11.43)** (11.87)**
CDS percent bid-ask -112.124 24.765 18.167
(9.54)** (1.75) (1.32)
Leverage 68.699 55.460
(6.63)** (5.59)**
Tangible Assets -9.749 -16.628
(2.49)* (3.30)**
Current Ratio 0.921 1.927
(0.56) (1.16)
Constant 32.711 73.168 -51.015 -42.200
(3.17)** (7.64)** (4.33)** (1.88)
Observations 28631 28364 14568 14568
R-squared 0.15 0.44 0.60 0.61
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 7: Pooled regressions of the average basis: This table shows the coefficients on various bond
characteristic dummy variables including covenants for pooled regressions on around 29,000 bond-quarter
observations for 5,792 bonds issued by 1,167 firms for the period from July 2002 to June 2006. The dependent
variable is the average quarterly CDS-bond basis computed using par equivalent corporate bond spreads
calculated using TRACE data and CDS prices from GFI/CMA. The basis is the difference between the
CDS spread and the par equivalent spread of the corporate bond. Latent liquidity information is from the
custodial database, while trade count for corporate bonds is computed using TRACE data. The rating refers
to the numerical code used to represent quarterly S&P ratings on domestic debt obtained from Compustat.
The bond covenants are taken from Bloomberg’s list of bond covenants. Firm level variables such as leverage
and tangible assets are calculated using the Compustat quarterly data for the previous quarter. CDS market
liquidity and standard deviations are computed using GFI/CMA CDS prices.
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Dependent variable : Average CDS-Bond basis
Credit Sensitive 9.845 Poison Put -5.586
(0.98) (0.42)
Defeased -8.454 Principal Index Linked 0.000
(3.12)** (.)
Equity Clawback -12.376 Prospectus on File 5.889
(0.82) (0.74)
Euro Sales Tax -19.567 Secured 26.488
(5.31)** (3.79)**
Exchange listed 1.373 Special Put 3.133
(0.44) (0.46)
Fund Terms 48.299 Tap Issue -3.690
(1.78)* (1.33)
Guarantee 7.192 Tax Call 3.134
(1.68)* (0.91)
Table 8: Coefficients of bond dummy variables in pooled regressions of the average basis: This
table shows the coefficients on various bond characteristic dummy variables including covenants for pooled
regressions on around 14,600 bond-quarter observations for 5,792 bonds issued by 1,167 firms the period from
July 2002 to June 2006. These coefficients are a continuation of column 4 of the regression in table 7. The
dependent variable is the average quarterly CDS-bond basis computed using par equivalent corporate bond
spreads calculated using TRACE data and CDS prices from GFI/CMA. The basis is the difference between
the CDS spread and the par equivalent spread of the corporate bond. The bond covenants are taken from
Bloomberg’s list of bond covenants. Firm level ratios are calculated using the Compustat quarterly data for
the previous quarter. CDS market liquidity and standard deviations are computed using GFI/CMA CDS
prices.
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Dependent variable : Average CDS-Bond basis
Coupon -17.634 -17.401 -17.719
(11.07)** (10.93)** (11.12)**
Latent Liquidity 16.665 10.783 14.589
(9.24)** (6.21)** (8.27)**
No. of trades (100) 0.142 0.187 0.193
(1.48) (1.96) (2.02)*
Maturity (yrs) -2.306 -2.299 -2.293
(12.92)** (13.09)** (13.05)**
Age (yrs) 2.048 1.686 1.902
(4.65)** (3.86)** (4.30)**
Log (Issue Size) 5.142 6.327 6.089
(7.69)** (9.78)** (9.48)**
S&P Rating 1.886 2.386 1.732
(3.42)** (4.24)** (3.16)**
CDS Vol -0.011 0.014 0.004
(0.22) (0.28) (0.08)
CDS bid-ask 2.097 2.086 2.074
(11.32)** (11.19)** (11.36)**
cdspctbidask 25.985 17.651 27.235
(2.30)* (1.54) (2.44)*
Leverage 87.098 82.610 81.651
(14.14)** (13.58)** (13.42)**
Tangible Assets -18.046 -18.278 -17.208
(5.00)** (5.27)** (4.88)**
Interaction Dummy (1) 40.534 26.024
(8.24)** (4.71)**
Interaction Dummy (2) 60.529 47.233
(9.57)** (6.54)**
Constant 25.174 12.206 17.626
(2.21)* (1.09) (1.56)
Observations 22863 22863 22863
R-squared 0.50 0.50 0.50
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 9: Pooled regressions of the average basis with liquidity and risk interaction terms: This
table shows the coefficients on various bond characteristic dummy variables including covenants for pooled
regressions on around 29,000 bond-quarter observations for 5,792 bonds issued by 1,167 firms for the period
from July 2002 to June 2006. The dependent variable is the average quarterly CDS-bond basis computed
using par equivalent corporate bond spreads calculated using TRACE data and CDS prices from GFI/CMA.
The basis is the difference between the CDS spread and the par equivalent spread of the corporate bond.
Latent liquidity information is from the custodial database, while trade count for corporate bonds is computed
using TRACE data. The rating refers to the numerical code used to represent quarterly S&P ratings on
domestic debt obtained from Compustat. Firm level variables such as leverage and tangible assets are
calculated using the Compustat quarterly data for the previous quarter. CDS market liquidity and standard
deviations are computed using GFI/CMA CDS prices. ThIS table has two interaction dummy variables.
The first dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the bond lies in the lowest liquidity quintile as measured
by latent liquidity and the highest default risk quintile as measured by the CDS spread of the issuer. The
second dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the bond lies in the lowest liquidity quintile as measured by
trading volume and the highest default risk quintile as measured by the CDS spread of the issuer.
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Dependent variable : Average CDS-Bond basis
Coupon -11.515 -18.850 -4.984 -5.788
(4.74)** (9.02)** (2.91)** (2.94)**
Latent Liquidity 5.299 6.411 5.146 4.842
(3.72)** (5.16)** (3.83)** (3.69)**
No. of trades (100) -0.616 -0.397 -0.572 -0.203
(3.14)** (2.16)* (1.76) (0.64)
Maturity (yrs) -1.504 -1.577 -1.899 -1.953
(10.08)** (11.29)** (12.93)** (12.65)**
Age (yrs) -5.082 -2.413 -3.284 -6.132
(7.26)** (4.59)** (6.99)** (9.10)**
Log (Issue Size) 4.360 5.495 6.579 8.105
(5.29)** (8.26)** (7.02)** (4.43)**
S&P Rating 7.956 6.077 0.361 0.776
(12.15)** (11.54)** (0.38) (0.83)
CDS Vol -0.156 -0.160 -0.161
(3.25)** (3.42)** (3.42)**
CDS bid-ask 2.190 2.088 2.074
(9.16)** (10.48)** (10.48)**
pctbidask -109.480 -30.045 -33.437
(8.69)** (1.60) (1.78)
Leverage 69.525 53.777
(5.13)** (4.03)**
Tangible Assets 0.460 -11.576
(0.10) (1.90)
Current Ratio 4.018 3.895
(2.18)* (2.00)*
Constant 10.849 48.271 -32.216 -10.612
(0.94) (5.07)** (3.28)** (0.50)
Observations 22734 22734 11654 11654
Robust t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table 10: Robustness check for the subsample of CDS prices from CMA: This table shows the
coefficients of various bond characteristic dummy variables including covenants for pooled regressions on
around 29000 bond-quarter observations for 5,792 bonds issued by 1,167 firms for the period from October
2004 to June 2006. The dependent variable is the average quarterly CDS-bond basis computed using par
equivalent corporate bond spreads calculated using TRACE data and CDS prices from CMA. The basis
is the difference between the CDS spread and the par equivalent spread of the corporate bond. Latent
liquidity information is from the custodial database, while trade count for corporate bonds is computed
using TRACE data. The rating refers to the Compustat numerical code used to represent quarterly S&P
ratings on domestic debt obtained from Compustat. The bond covenants are taken from Bloomberg’s list of
bond covenants. Firm level variables such as leverage and tangible assets are calculated using the Compustat
quarterly data for the previous quarter. CDS market liquidity and standard deviations are computed using
CMA CDS prices.
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Latent Liquidity Rating Class
quintile AAA AA A BBB BB >= C
1 25.64 41.79 21.88 10.46 72.57 245.08
(2.55) (2.21) (0.83) (0.95) (3.62) (14.61)
2 71.03 43.30 35.38 20.92 108.76 271.66
(5.66) (2.52) (1.34) (1.73) (15.06) (47.12)
3 84.34 44.31 41.32 24.85 135.06 137.09
(5.04) (2.16) (1.31) (1.65) (15.78) (21.55)
4 60.73 44.12 50.55 32.44 100.25 87.66
(5.87) (2.75) (1.29) (1.52) (8.74) (11.81)
5 81.66 50.19 52.50 42.70 92.26 127.12
(4.17) (2.56) (1.75) (1.75) (8.81) (13.33)
Table 11: Average basis in sub-sets sorted by latent liquidity and rating: This table shows the
average CDS-bond basis in a sample of around 14,600 bond-quarter observations for 5,792 bonds issued by
1,167 firms for the period from July 2002 to June 2006. For every quarter, the data are sorted along two
dimensions into five groups in increasing order of their latent liquidity and further by their S&P rating class.
The numbers in the table are the means computed for each sub-group. Figures in parentheses are clustered
standard errors for the mean, where the clustering is by individual bond.
Trade volume Rating Class
quintile AAA AA A BBB BB >= C
1 40.04 30.67 12.95 3.28 182.37 286.54
(4.94) (3.82) (1.66) (2.74) (8.78) (19.45)
2 36.02 80.30 28.56 20.24 65.28 226.86
(4.83) (5.23) (1.48) (1.28) (7.39) (33.40)
3 38.49 40.83 37.25 20.78 54.68 176.80
(4.14) (2.39) (1.01) (1.08) (5.04) (20.35)
4 44.53 31.29 39.23 23.37 59.79 129.17
(4.26) (1.39) (0.91) (1.11) (4.74) (16.69)
5 68.15 37.90 43.60 34.28 115.42 182.67
(3.66) (1.30) (0.92) (1.44) (9.04) (12.14)
Table 12: Average basis in sub-sets sorted by trading volume and rating: This table shows the
average CDS-bond basis in a sample of around 14,600 bond-quarter observations for 5,792 bonds issued
by 1,167 firms for the period from July 2002 to June 2006. For every quarter, the data are sorted along
two dimensions into five groups in increasing order of the volume traded for that quarter and further by
their S&P rating class. The numbers in the table are the means computed for each sub-group. Figures in
parentheses are clustered standard errors for the mean, where the clustering is by individual bond.
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Latent Liquidity Leverage quintile
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
1 16.79 15.38 29.62 42.68 106.42
(0.96) (1.22) (1.84) (1.96) (5.33)
2 26.76 24.78 32.35 31.22 78.74
(1.71) (2.05) (2.52) (2.39) (4.40)
3 27.93 31.66 41.23 38.20 76.36
(1.78) (2.10) (2.33) (2.06) (3.88)
4 29.42 38.17 43.33 47.00 77.46
(1.95) (2.06) (2.15) (2.03) (3.13)
5 33.96 35.08 51.36 49.93 88.26
(2.81) (2.74) (2.09) (2.22) (3.58)
Table 13: Average basis in sub-sets sorted by latent liquidity and firm leverage: This table shows
the average CDS-bond basis in a sample of around 14,600 bond-quarter observations for 5,792 bonds issued
by 1,167 firms for the period from July 2002 to June 2006. For every quarter, the data are sorted along two
dimensions into five groups in increasing order of latent liquidity of the bonds for that quarter and further
by the leverage of the firms issuing the bonds. The numbers in the table are the means computed for each
sub-group. Figures in parentheses are clustered standard errors for the mean, where the clustering is by
individual bond.
Trade volume Leverage quintile
quintile 1 2 3 4 5
1 -9.22 0.67 21.65 51.06 117.59
(2.39) (1.96) (3.38) (5.29) (6.27)
2 18.27 23.01 45.81 45.02 120.21
(1.39) (1.77) (3.41) (2.44) (12.17)
3 28.72 28.80 30.73 39.12 90.83
(1.18) (1.76) (1.80) (1.71) (5.41)
4 33.00 31.50 32.71 39.14 70.74
(1.26) (1.74) (1.43) (1.62) (4.30)
5 34.44 39.35 49.23 39.02 77.28
(1.48) (1.80) (1.75) (1.60) (2.45)
Table 14: Average basis in sub-sets sorted by trading volume and leverage: This table shows the
average CDS-bond basis in a sample of around 14,600 bond-quarter observations for 5,792 bonds issued by
1,167 firms for the period from July 2002 to June 2006. For every quarter, the data are sorted along two
dimensions into five groups in increasing order of the volume traded for that quarter and further in increasing
order the leverage of the firms issuing the bonds. The numbers in the table are the means computed for
each sub-group. Figures in parentheses are clustered standard errors for the mean, where the clustering is
by individual bond.
48
